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Abstract 
 
Given a limited warning time, an asteroid impact mitigation campaign would hinge on uncertainty-based 
information consisting of remote observational data of the identified Earth-threatening object, general knowledge 
of near-Earth asteroids (NEAs), and engineering judgment. Due to these ambiguities, the campaign credibility 
could be profoundly compromised. It is therefore imperative to comprehensively evaluate the inherent uncertainty 
in deflection and plan the campaign accordingly to ensure successful mitigation. This research demonstrates 
dual-deflection mitigation campaigns consisting of primary (instantaneous/quasi-instantaneous) and secondary 
(slow-push) deflection missions, where both deflection efficiency and campaign credibility are taken into account. 
The results of the dual-deflection campaign analysis show that there are trade-offs between the competing aspects: 
the launch cost, mission duration, deflection distance, and the confidence in successful deflection. The design 
approach is found to be useful for multi-deflection campaign planning, allowing us to select the best possible 
combination of missions from a catalogue of campaign options, without compromising the campaign credibility. 
 
Keywords: near-Earth asteroid, deflection technique, dual-deflection campaign, uncertain information, 
multi-objective optimization 
 
Nomenclatures 
 
p : vector of mitigation system design parameters 
  : vector of mitigation system design variables 
  : vector of mitigation system indicators 
  :  momentum multiplication/enhancement factor 
   : asteroid mass, kg 
   : geometric albedo value 
       : micro-density, g/cm
3
 
      : bulk-porosity 
  : equivalent diameter of asteroid, m 
   : unperturbed geocentric hyperbolic excess velocity vector 
b : impact parameter/b-plane deflection vector 
   : Earth’s radius, 6,371 km 
   : b-plane deflection scaling actual deflection equal to the Earth’s radius    
   : Earth’s escape velocity, 11.2 km/s 
   : ‖  ‖ 
  : gravity constant, 6.67259×10-11 m3/kg/s2 
   : mass of the Earth, 5.9742×10
24
 kg 
   : mass of the Sun, 1.98855×10
30
 kg 
   : GM product of the Sun,     
  : semimajor axis, AU 
  : eccentricity 
  : inclination, deg 
   : Earth’s heliocentric velocity vector 
  
  :    projected on b-plane 
  : incoming asymptote direction 
  : negative direction of   
  
  :     
  : ‖ ‖ 
𝜔 : argument of pericentre, deg 
𝛺 : argument of ascending node, deg 
𝜃MOID : true anomaly at MOID point, deg 
   : instantaneous velocity change, cm/s 
   : variation in impact parameter b, Earth-radius 
      : safe b-plane deflection for impact risk mitigation, Earth-radius 
    : required    to satisfy     , cm/s 
       : required    to satisfy        , cm/s 
    : Belief 
   : Plausibility 
  : event   
  : elementary proposition 
     : degree of confidence in elementary proposition   
  : universal set/frame of discernment 
  : empty set 
   : uncertain parameter 
   -    : upper and lower bounds of intervals of    
   -    : BPAs associated with each interval 
  : event   
  : event   
     : degree of confidence in the truth of event   
      : degree of confidence in the truth of event   
      : degree of confidence in the truth of event   
     : nominal b-plane deflection, Earth-radius 
   : set of parameters 
       : degree of confidence in the truth of set    
       : micro-porosity 
      : bulk-density, g/cm
3
 
  : impactor velocity, km/s 
  : asteroid tensile strength, N/m2 
  : impactor density, g/cm3 
𝐹 : deflection leverage, N 
    : GT system mass, kg 
R : standoff distance, m 
    : specific impulse, second 
   : primary mitigation system mass at NEA arrival, kg 
   : secondary mitigation system mass at NEA arrival, kg 
   : Earth departure time of primary interceptor 
     : flight time of primary interceptor, day 
   : Earth departure time of secondary interceptor 
      : primary interception start time 
     : flight time of secondary interceptor, day 
     : relative velocity of KI spacecraft with respect to the asteroid, km/s 
      : impact velocity increment of KI spacecraft in addition to     , km/s 
     : GT mission time duration, day 
     : SC mission time duration, day 
   : one asteroid orbital period, day 
  D   : mass of primary mitigation system at EDS, ton 
  D   : mass of secondary mitigation system at EDS, ton 
   : sum of   D   and   D  , ton 
    : asteroid arrival time of primary mitigation system 
    : asteroid arrival time of secondary mitigation system 
       : Belief of      
      : Plausibility of      
      : post-primary deflection trim deflection through secondary mission, Earth-radius 
  I : KI system mass 
     : fraction of   I that makes an impact with the asteroid 
     |   
: propellant mass for KI system’s terminal guidance 
  I : NI system mass 
    : nuclear warhead mass 
    : SC system mass 
    : collector assembly mass 
    : diameter of collector 
    : GT system mass 
     : dry mass 
     |      
: propellant mass for hovering 
    : power supply mass 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As of today, several asteroid deflection concepts have been proposed and they are under preliminary 
investigation. Some of these concepts appear to be feasible with the current technology developed through deep 
space exploration missions, whereas others require certain levels of technological advancement before they can 
be considered as feasible deflection alternatives. Also, a deflection technique which makes use of nuclear 
devices for example, involves political issues to be tackled with in global cooperation. Nevertheless, we now 
recognise that it is not unrealistic to prevent an impact event by a modest-sized (<150 metres in diameter) 
near-Earth asteroid (NEA) if it can be discovered and identified to be threatening about a decade in advance of 
the impact event [1]. Most importantly, even such small asteroids can cause a local devastation far greater than 
the Tunguska event in 1908 or the Chelyabinsk meteor event on the 15th of February in 2013. Fortunately, 
statistically speaking, or based on the NEA population that has been discovered so far, it is more likely that 
hazardous NEAs to be mitigated in the foreseeable future will be in this modest size range, rather than 
kilometre-sized NEAs which can potentially trigger a global catastrophe such as the Cretaceous-Palaeogene 
(K-Pg) extinction event [2]. Although it is not obvious that a kilometre-sized object will not collide with the 
Earth in the near future as those undiscovered may be on collisional trajectory, the size of an Earth-threatening 
object basically scales the cost of mitigation campaigns (of course, this is not always the case if the use of high 
yield-to-weight nuclear interception is allowed for instance) but is not significant to the main focuses of this 
study: the uncertain information and mitigation campaign credibility. While characterisation of larger NEAs 
may be done more accurately and affect mitigation mission design, this paper does not intend to focus on 
kilometre-sized objects but it will only deal with hazard mitigation of the modest, 140-metre sized NEAs with 
warning time of 10-20 years for conciseness. This range of warning time is rather optimistic for hundred-metre 
sized threatening objects, considering the limited capability of asteroid orbit determination by today’s telescopic 
surveillance [3]. Note that the warning time in this paper is defined as the time period between the detection of a 
hazardous NEA and the Earth impact epoch of the hazardous NEA; however, it does not take the mission 
preparation time into consideration. It is assumed that mitigation systems will be developed and fabricated based 
on a spacecraft bus in a similar way to the interceptor stack concept proposed by Adams et al. [4] such that the 
preparation time does not require many years unlike conventional space exploration missions. Readers 
interested in more detailed analysis on Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) of different mitigation systems 
should refer to the existing literature by Sanchez et al. [1]. 
The most notable feature of asteroid deflection mission is that the characteristics (orbital parameters, 
physical properties, dynamical properties, etc.) of the NEA are deeply embedded into the design as an integral 
part of the mitigation systems, and influence their deflection performance. Figure 1 is a schematic diagram that 
describes such hazardous asteroid mitigation system design as multidisciplinary system design. The mitigation 
system design involves three basic vectors  ,  , and   where 
 
 p is a vector of design parameters representing fundamental properties of the hazardous NEA (e.g. orbit, 
physical property, etc.) and environmental parameters (e.g. gravity, solar constant, radiation pressure, etc.). 
 
   is a vector of mitigation system design variables (e.g. mass and impact velocity of kinetic impactor (KI), 
mass of nuclear interceptor (NI), mirror size of solar collector (SC), mass and hovering altitude of gravity 
tractor (GT), etc.). 
 
   is a vector of mitigation performance indicators of campaign (e.g. launch cost, mission duration, deflection 
distance, confidence in successful deflection, etc.). 
 
 
Figure 1 Hazardous NEA mitigation system design. 
 
Recent work by Sugimoto et al. [5] has shown that, for the 10-year warning time impact scenarios, only 
limited information about the hazardous NEA would be available and that this will most likely come only from 
ground-based or space-based characterisation approaches. In such cases, the majority of deflection techniques 
will be subject to epistemic uncertainties and measurement errors in the NEA characteristics, which could lead 
to compromised outcomes of mitigation. It is therefore essential to investigate mitigation campaign planning 
that involves design of a reliable and robust hazardous NEA mitigation system. The mitigation campaign should 
guarantee high confidence in successful mitigation even if the preliminary NEA characterisation is incomplete. 
The main objective of this research is to demonstrate a mitigation campaign planning approach that results in 
efficient, reliable, and yet robust hazardous NEA mitigation for the 10-20 warning-time scenarios. The 
additional objective is to ensure the flexibility in deflection in order to avoid undesired key-hole passage on the 
b-plane [6] due to the primary deflection. 
To fulfil these objectives, we have considered a dual-deflection mitigation approach that makes use of an 
instantaneous/quasi-instantaneous deflection technique (KI/NI/SC) as a primary deflection mission and a 
slow-push deflection technique (GT) as a secondary deflection mission. The use of a GT as a secondary 
deflection mission for the secondary impact keyhole avoidance was suggested in the JPL report by Yeomans et 
al. [7] in 2008. They also pointed out that tracking of the GT spacecraft would provide precise information 
about the asteroid orbit before and after the primary deflection mission and also after the GT trim manoeuvre. 
Their study however, assumed the range of the momentum enhancement factor   of the NEA (     ) in 
order to evaluate possible outcomes of the primary deflection achieved through a KI mission instead of 
considering the uncertainties in the NEA characteristics. Such combined mitigation measures have been also 
investigated as a part of the NEOShield project [8]. 
Design of a dual-deflection mitigation campaign involves trade-offs between the competing aspects (the 
launch cost, mission duration, deflection distance, and the confidence in successful deflection) which are to be 
optimised in order to minimise the launch cost of hazardous NEA mitigation systems and total campaign period 
while maximising the deflection performance and the confidence in successful mitigation campaign. 
This paper is articulated as follows. In Section 2, the fundamental aspects of preliminary NEA 
characterisation subject to the available warning time, associated epistemic uncertainties, and inevitable 
measurement errors are briefly highlighted. Section 3 gives an overview of hazardous NEA deflection missions 
of KI, NI, SC, and GT and associated uncertainty in the outcomes of deflection missions due to the incomplete 
information on the characteristics of the target NEA. Section 4 details the planning of a combined hazardous 
NEA mitigation campaign consisting of two different deflection missions, followed by the mitigation campaign 
optimisation approach used in this paper. Finally, we present the results of analysis on the dual-deflection 
campaigns consisting of a KI/NI/SC mission backed up by a GT mission in Section 5. 
 
2. Preliminary characterisation of hazardous NEA 
 
Preliminary characterisation of an identified hazardous NEA is essential during the early stages of mitigation 
campaign planning to appropriately design mitigation systems based on the available information regarding the 
fundamental characteristics (e.g. physical, dynamical, orbital properties, etc.) of the target NEA. Sending a 
precursor mission to the NEA is obviously preferable in terms of measurement accuracy as well as to avoid 
possible mischaracterisation in size, mass, etc.; however, in reality, available characterisation options will be 
dependent on the given warning time and the NEA orbit. 
In the following subsections, three different characterisation approaches – ground-based, space-based, and 
proximity characterisation – are presented and their degrees of measurement accuracy are briefly summarised. 
The ground-based characterisation approach is explained more in detail here along with its characterisation 
diagram as this is the most likely characterisation scenario. Two types of uncertainties – epistemic uncertainties 
and measurement errors – associated with the preliminary NEA characterisation are then introduced. In addition, 
aleatory uncertainties are presented for reference, since these are related to the practical limitations (i.e. errors) 
on mitigation systems (e.g. lack of precision). 
 
2.1. Characterisation scenarios 
 
Depending on the available warning time, preliminary characterisation of a hazardous NEA will vary since 
each characterisation approach will have a different degree of uncertainty. There are basically three different 
preliminary characterisation approaches: ground-based, space-based, and proximity characterisation. 
The ground-based characterisation makes use of telescopic and radar observations from the Earth whereas 
the space-based characterisation leverages infrared astronomical satellites (IRAS) in space in addition to the 
ground-based observation options. These two characterisation scenarios would require only a few days during 
close Earth approaches of NEAs to complete the preliminary characterisation [9], which means they could be 
possibly used simultaneously with the first discovery of a hazardous NEA by radar or telescope. On the other 
hand, the proximity characterisation approach, which requires a precursor mission to the target NEA, would take 
<1¼ years to complete the preliminary characterisation [10]. The availability of precursor mission is subject to 
the orbit of an identified threatening NEA while, particularly for the 10-20 warning-time cases, quick 
preliminary characterisation is essential to ensure a wider mitigation campaign window (i.e. the period between 
the Earth departure of mitigation systems and the completion of NEA mitigation campaign). The wider 
campaign window results in more mitigation campaign options and more efficient mitigation, even though the 
preliminary characterisation may remain incomplete without a precursor mission. 
The accuracy of observational information by the ground-based characterisation is based on the capability of 
ground-based telescopes and radar instruments on Earth, and thus the majority of physical parameters of the target 
object will remain highly uncertain [11]. Microscopic properties of a NEA can be estimated by analysing the 
surface colour and solar spectral reflectance while macroscopic characteristics such as the mass and the porosity 
are much more difficult to be ascertained particularly when the object is only a few hundred metres or so in 
diameter. According to Müller et al. [12], the ground-based telescopic observations with the Thermal Infrared 
Multimode Instrument dedicated to 3-25 micron range (TIMMI2) have demonstrated higher performance at NEA 
characterisation than the radar telescopic observations (e.g. Arecibo and Goldstone) as the asteroid 
sub-surface/internal structures can be roughly estimated through thermal characterisation of the asteroidal surface. 
However, in this study, such advanced ground-based mid-infrared observations are not considered to distinguish 
the ground-based characterisation from the space-based characterisation which makes use of infrared observation. 
Figure 2 is the simplified diagram of the ground-based characterisation approach. The fundamental physical 
characteristics (mass, size, albedo, and momentum enhancement) for mitigation system design are derived from 
the ground-based observational data, meteorite analogues of the NEA, and expert opinions regarding the macro 
porosity (i.e. large structural flaws inside the NEA). Crucially, the mass determination of the NEA cannot be done 
directly through the ground-based observations since it requires additional information from meteorite analogues 
regarding the microscopic characteristics of the main material that composes the asteroid and expert opinions 
regarding the macro porosity to estimate the bulk density of the NEA. It is therefore inevitable that there would be 
major uncertainties in the preliminary characterisation, particularly in the mass (i.e. bulk density) and albedo value 
for the case of ground-based characterisation. 
 
 Figure 2 Ground-based characterisation diagram. 
 
2.2. Types of uncertainty 
 
There are three basic types of uncertainty – epistemic uncertainty, error (i.e. numerical uncertainty), and 
aleatory uncertainty – derived from different sources regarding the NEA characteristics or mitigation systems. 
In general, epistemic uncertainties arise when a system is not sufficiently characterised, certain 
characteristics of the system are neglected, or the physical model of the system is based on hypotheses rather 
than experiments. Our current characterisation on the NEA population including potentially hazardous asteroids 
is insufficient, hence epistemic uncertainties exist in general knowledge of NEAs. This type of uncertainties can 
be reduced by obtaining more credible information on the specific threatening NEAs or by improving general 
knowledge of the NEA population. Moreover, epistemic uncertainties also exist in design of low TRL 
components of a mitigation system such as the solar-pumped laser ablation system [13]. Unlike aleatory 
uncertainties, representation of epistemic uncertainties requires an appropriate quantification technique such as 
Evidence Theory [14]. 
Errors (i.e. numerical uncertainties) are a recognisable deficiency due to practical constraints on a system in 
general. The in-situ mass determination by the Hayabusa spacecraft, for example, had about 5% of measurement 
error which is thought to be due to the relatively small mass of Itokawa [15] – 190,000 times smaller than that of 
Eros, whose mass was determined within 0.05% [16]. The size determination of NEAs from the ground is also 
subject to the resolution of telescopic and radar images due to the practical constraints on the ground-based 
observational instruments. This type of uncertainties can be minimised by simply applying more accurate 
measurement techniques. Unlike the other types of uncertainties, the source is often known such that one can 
often estimate error magnitudes in advance. Measurement errors in NEA size, rotation state, and shape 
determination could be as significant as epistemic uncertainties in mass determination, however the hazardous 
asteroid is modelled as a spherical body throughout this work and these problems are not dealt with. Care must 
be therefore taken for the accuracy/applicability of the results in this paper by the readers intending to compare 
their study on asteroid deflection techniques applied to a more realistic misshapen asteroid model for instance. 
Brief discussion on how the asteroid shape affects the deflection techniques is provided in subsection 3.1. 
Aleatory uncertainties (also known as inherent uncertainties) represent a random variation in a system, 
which is inevitably present in every outcome of the system. For the case of KI, there will be, for instance, a 
certain amount of possibility of missing the target point on the NEA surface, or at worst the NEA itself due to 
aleatory uncertainties in the precision of the KI system. Such practical limitations of the KI technique is 
associated with epistemic uncertainties and measurement errors in NEA size, rotation state, shape, centre of 
gravity, etc., and a very high-velocity (10-20 km/s or >30 km/s for retrograde orbits) impact relative to a 
modest-sized object in space. For the case of SC, the acceleration of the target body (i.e. the surface material 
evaporation rate) will always fluctuate due to aleatory uncertainties in the solar flux, the asteroid surface 
condition, the mirror degradation with time. This type of uncertainties cannot be completely eliminated but they 
can be mathematically modelled using a conventional probability theory, once a sufficient amount of statistical 
data is available. For example, the effects of aleatory uncertainties on asteroid deflection actions can be 
evaluated by means of Monte-Carlo simulation; however, applying a Monte-Carlo simulation to the mitigation 
campaign planning and optimisation approach considered in this study will substantially increase the cost of 
computation. The authors are currently working on asteroid deflection mission analysis on this aspect, the 
results of which are excluded from this paper. Care must be therefore taken when dealing with the results of this 
paper and comparing with the results from other literature that take the aleatory uncertainties into account. 
Epistemic uncertainties will be the most common cause of the uncertain physical properties of the target 
body, followed by measurement errors unless our general knowledge of NEAs is abundant and unbiased. Table 1 
summarises the uncertainties in NEA mass    and geometric albedo    corresponding to the three different 
characterisation options and three different taxonomic classes: S-type, C-type, and M-type, where the NEA mass 
   can be determined by referring to the micro density       , bulk porosity      , and the equivalent 
diameter   of the NEA, according to Equation (1). 
 
                    4𝜋  2⁄  
 3⁄  (1)   
 
These uncertainties originate from the lower and upper bounds of the uncertain NEA physical properties given 
in Table 12 in Appendix A.1. As can be seen, more rigorous but possibly more time-consuming characterisation 
results in smaller ranges of uncertainties in the physical properties for all the taxonomic classes. Interested readers 
should refer to Appendix A.1 for further details on the uncertain NEA physical properties. 
  
Table 1 Uncertainties in the mass    and the geometric albedo    of the NEA corresponding to the 
ground-based, space-based, and the proximity characterisation scenarios. They are represented in percentage 
relative to the mean physical properties of each taxonomic class. A) S-type. B) C-type. C) M-type. 
A) Ground-based Space-based Proximity 
   –36.1-45.7% –28.8-36.8% –5.4-9.0% 
   –46.4-50.0% –23.8-31.7% –10.0-10.0% 
 
B) Ground-based Space-based Proximity 
   –41.3-45.6% –32.3-35.5% –4.0-4.7% 
   –26.5-34.1% –23.8-31.7% –10.0-10.0% 
 
C) Ground-based Space-based Proximity 
   –27.3-24.5% –21.5-20.8% –3.0-2.0% 
   –28.6-42.9% –23.8-31.7% –10.0-10.0% 
 
3. Hazardous NEA deflection 
 
The deflection representation of hazardous NEAs in this work is based on the b-plane concept that is applied 
to planetary encounter analyses [6]. The b-plane is oriented normal to the incoming asymptote of the osculating 
geocentric hyperbola, in other words, it is oriented normal to the object’s unperturbed geocentric/hyperbolic 
excess velocity vector    as shown in Figure 3. The b-plane analysis can not only determine whether an Earth 
collision is possible, but also determine how close to Earth the encounter will be. Furthermore, understanding the 
position of an Earth encountering object on the b-plane (i.e. the uncertainty ellipsoid projected on the b-plane) is 
prerequisite to the keyhole analysis. The minimum distance of the unperturbed trajectory at the closest approach 
point on the b-plane is called the impact parameter b denoted by a red line segment in Figure 3. The impact 
parameter itself does not reveal whether the perturbed trajectory will intersect the Earth figure projected on the 
b-plane; however, it can be available by scaling Earth’s radius    according to Equation (2) 
 
      √        ⁄  (2)   
 
where    is Earth’s escape velocity and    is the hyperbolic excess velocity given as follows. 
 
   
  2     ⁄  (3)   
 
   
    (3    ⁄  2√           ) (4)   
 
A given trajectory intersects the Earth figure on the b-plane if ‖ ‖ is smaller than the scaled Earth-radius   , 
and not otherwise. On the b-plane the   coordinate is the minimum distance that can be obtained by varying the 
timing of the encounter. This distance, known as the minimum orbital intersection distance (MOID), is equivalent 
to the minimum separation between the osculating ellipses, regardless of the location of the objects on their orbits. 
Throughout this work, the MOID is basically set to zero and thus the incoming asteroid passes through the origin 
of the b-plane reference frame (i.e. the centre of Earth). 
 
 Figure 3 B-plane reference frame   ,  ,    on the Earth b-plane. The red arrow represents the impact parameter b 
which is to be manipulated through an asteroid deflection mission for planetary defense purposes. 
 
A hazardous NEA mitigation campaign therefore comes down to nudging the NEA and making   at least 
greater than    on the b-plane of the impact epoch. Achieved deflections on the b-plane by the instantaneous 
and slow-push deflection techniques are computed by means of the proximal motion equations and Gauss’ 
variational equations [17]. The proximal motion equations describe the variation of the position vector of the 
asteroid after a deflection attempt with respect to its unperturbed position, assuming the perturbed orbit is 
proximal to the unperturbed one. The variation vector is given as displacements in the radial, transversal, and 
perpendicular to the orbit plane directions, respectively. The variations of the orbital parameters of the asteroid 
are then computed through Gauss’ variational equations. For slow-push deflection techniques, the Gauss’ 
variational equations are numerically integrated over the deflection mission duration. 
Two instantaneous deflection techniques (KI and NI) and two slow-push deflection techniques (SC and GT) 
are considered here. The mathematical models of these techniques are basically based on the models used in the 
work of Sugimoto et al. [5], which are originally developed in the work of Sanchez et al. in 2009 [1]. The 
modes of operation for all the mitigation systems considered in this paper are summarised in Table 2. Among 
them, only the KI mission intercepts the target NEA at high speed. 
 
Table 2 Modes of operation for KI, NI, SC, and GT mitigation systems. 
Mitigation system Type of NEA 
approach 
Type of deflection action Duration of deflection action 
KI high-velocity 
interception 
high-velocity impact by spacecraft instantaneous 
NI orbital 
rendezvous 
deflection by means of standoff 
nuclear explosion of spacecraft 
instantaneous 
SC orbital 
rendezvous 
slow-push deflection through 
sublimating asteroid material by 
spacecraft 
days to month(s) 
GT orbital 
rendezvous 
slow-push deflection through 
gravitational tractoring by spacecraft 
years to decade(s) 
 
In the next subsections, six virtual hazardous NEAs to be mitigated and their associated hazard scenarios are 
presented and the objective of NEA deflection on the b-plane is summarised. Finally, the derivation method and 
algorithm to represent the uncertainty of NEA deflection missions by Evidence Theory are introduced. 
3.1. Virtual hazardous NEAs 
 
Virtual Earth-threatening impactors are imaginary hazardous asteroids on collision courses with Earth that will 
be mitigated by means of asteroid deflection in this study. Six virtual impactors (VI1-VI6) were generated to 
represent a realistic population of impactors by taking into account the relative impact frequency of each possible 
trajectory [18]. The impact frequency of each trajectory was estimated by means of Öpik’s collision theory [19] 
and Bottke’s near-Earth objects orbital model [20]. The orbits of the virtual Earth impactors are shown in Figure 
4. The orbit type of VI1, VI2, and VI3 is Apollo whereas that of VI4, VI5, and VI6
 
is Aten. The Keplerian elements of 
the virtual impactors are given in Table 3. 
The equivalent diameter of the virtual impactors is set to 140 metres unless otherwise stated although Earth 
impacts by NEAs of >50 metres in diameter are more frequent, and therefore more hazardous to the Earth in that 
sense. It is assumed, in this paper, that NEAs with 140 metres in diameter would represent the worst possible size 
among the subkilometre-sized NEA population, considering the insufficient NEA discovery completion rate of 
this size range (50-140 metres) in the foreseeable future. These relatively small NEAs can cause serious 
local-scale devastation on Earth far greater than the Tunguska event while they are not sufficiently discovered 
through the previous near-Earth object (NEO) surveys: the George E. Brown, Jr. Near-Earth Object Survey 
section of the 2005 NASA Authorization Mission, etc. The B612 Foundation’s Sentinel mission may detect 90% 
of NEOs of >140 metres in diameter and a fraction of those <140 metres by 2020 [21], however the detection of 
<140-metre sized NEOs will not likely reach a 90% discovery rate, at least in the next decade to come. 
NEAs are modelled as a sphere throughout this study although it is known that asteroid shapes in nature are 
inhomogeneous and they are significant to asteroid deflection action of any kind. The problem of asteroid 
inhomogeneity is often associated with the asteroid rotation because, if the target asteroid misshapen, some 
asteroid characteristics (e.g. standoff distance, surface material and geometry, etc.) important to the deflection 
techniques change as the asteroid rotates. For example, the KI system has to carefully make its terminal approach 
to the asteroid, considering its rotation and shape in order to make an impact on the desired point. The NI system 
has to carefully choose the standoff distance and the timing of nuclear detonation according to the shape and 
rotation of the asteroid in order to maximise the resultant deflection or to provide the nominal deflection as 
planned. The SC system, on the other hand, is also subject to the asteroid shape and rotation as the concentrated 
solar beam has to illuminate the rotating asteroid surface and evaporate its material, resulting in inevitable 
fluctuations in the thrust induced by evaporation. The GT system is not entirely free from this problem as the 
gravity of the asteroid fluctuates as the misshapen asteroid rotates. All of these issues are unique and should be 
rigorously assessed for each technique as an independent study. The uncertainty in shape determination must be 
also taken into account in order to apply the problem to this study, which would require further preliminary study 
on small body shape determination and modelling techniques for instance. The asteroids are therefore treated as a 
spherical body for the conciseness of the paper whose focus is on mitigation campaign planning and optimisation 
under the uncertain information. 
The Earth impact events of the virtual impactors take place on the 13th of April 2036 while each impactor is 
discovered and identified to be truly hazardous 10 years before the impact event, and thus a mitigation campaign 
will be launched and executed sometime in this 10-year warning time (i.e. between 2026/4/13 and 2036/4/13). 
Although there is only <20% chance that a >200-metre sized NEA would be discovered before the Earth impact 
given the capability of current telescopic surveillance according to the work by Morrison et al. [3], this warning 
time is assumed to be a reasonable period of time for 140-metre sized NEAs. 
 Figure 4 Orbits of virtual impactors VI1-VI6 and Earth. They can be categorised into two orbital groups: Apollo 
(VI1, VI2, and VI3) and Aten (VI4, VI5, and VI6) groups. A) Ecliptic plane view. B) Sideway view. 
 
Table 3 Keplerian elements of the virtual impactors. 𝜃MOID is the true anomaly at the MOID point. 
Virtual impactor   (AU)     (deg)   (deg) 𝜔 (deg) 𝜃MOID (deg) 
VI1 1.24 0.289 7.5 180 242 298 
VI2 1.78 0.813 2.5 0 119 241 
VI3 2.66 0.625 2.5 180 186 354 
VI4 0.81 0.731 2.5 180 32.4 148 
VI5 0.87 0.345 12.5 0 132 228 
VI6 0.95 0.550 22.5 180 307 233 
 
Impact velocities with respect to Earth, and resultant energy delivered to Earth by impact of VI1-VI6 are 
summarised in Table 4. The mass of each impactor refers to the nominal value given in Table 7. The energy 
delivered to Earth is therefore subject to the taxonomic class of the virtual impactors, hence three different values 
of resultant impact energy for each virtual impactor can be seen here. 
 
Table 4 Impact velocities with respect to Earth, and resultant delivered energy to Earth by VI1-VI6. 
 Impact velocity (km/s) Energy delivered by impact (megatons of TNT) 
S-type / C-type / M-type 
VI1 8.40 26.75 / 17.30 / 78.65 
VI2 28.03 297.67 / 192.50 / 875.18 
VI3 8.42 26.92 / 17.41 / 79.15 
VI4 21.16 170.00 / 109.68 / 498.63 
VI5 11.22 47.67 / 30.83 / 140.14 
VI6 19.85 149.30 / 96.55 / 438.96 
 
3.2. Objective of NEA deflection on b-plane 
 
There are two kinds of deflection distances to be considered – the minimum required deflection distance and 
the safe deflection distance. The minimum required deflection distance is simply equivalent to    whereas the 
safe deflection distance is set to       2   Earth-radii throughout this work. The latter is thought to be a desired 
deflection distance to safely avoid an asteroid impact with Earth by the Committee to Review Near-Earth Object 
Surveys and Hazard Mitigation Strategies; National Research Council [2]. 
The objective of hazardous NEA deflection mission is therefore to make the impact parameter   on the 2036 
b-plane at least greater than   , or       if possible. Table 5 shows   ,      , required impulsive velocity 
changes     to achieve   , and        to achieve       for the mitigation of VI1-6, respectively. These 
required impulsive velocity changes (tangential to the travelling direction) are computed for a kinetic impact at the 
optimal interception epochs (i.e. perihelia of VI1-6) when a required velocity change is minimal while satisfying 
     , given the 10-year warning time. Figure 5 shows the variation of deflection distance of VI1 on the 
2036 b-plane, given         cm/s at any time between 2026 and 2036. The velocity change should be applied 
on 9 October 2026 such that the b-plane deflection of one    can be achieved. 
 
 
Figure 5 Variation of deflection distance of VI1 on the 2036 b-plane, given         cm/s. 
 
Table 5 Minimum deflection distance   , safe deflection distance      , impulsive velocity change    , and 
the impulsive velocity change        that are required for the mitigation of VI1-6. The optimal interception 
epochs for respective virtual impactors range 2026/10/9-2027/8/14. 
    
(Earth-radius) 
    
(cm/s) 
      
(Earth-radius) 
       
(cm/s) 
Interception 
Epoch 
VI1 1.66 0.79 4.16 1.98 2026/10/9 
VI2 1.08 0.19 2.70 0.48 2026/12/10 
VI3 1.66 1.38 4.16 3.44 2027/8/14 
VI4 1.13 0.43 2.83 1.07 2026/8/31 
VI5 1.41 0.79 3.53 1.98 2026/9/17 
VI6 1.15 0.49 2.87 1.24 2027/2/17 
 3.3. Uncertainty in NEA deflection 
 
In this subsection, the performance of deflection techniques subject to epistemic uncertainties in the physical 
properties of the hazardous NEA is evaluated, where Evidence Theory [14] is employed to quantify the 
uncertainty in deflection performance. KI, NI, SC, and GT are applied to VI1-6 of different taxonomic 
classifications (S-, C-, and M-types) at different characterisation levels (ground-based, space-based, and 
proximity characterisation) for reference. 
Evidence Theory makes use of two probability measures called Belief (   ) and Plausibility (  ) as 
illustrated in Figure 6. Belief represents confidence in the truth of an event   (i.e. deflection) exclusive of 
uncertainty while Plausibility represents confidence in the truth of the same event inclusive of uncertainty. 
 
 
Figure 6 Belief and Plausibility [22]. 
 
Unlike probability measures of conventional probabilistic means, the sum of the Belief measure of the truth of 
the event   and that of its negation is not necessarily (            ̅   ). The two probability measures 
are therefore subject to the uncertain NEA characteristics in different ways; however, the more rigorous the 
preliminary characterisation is, the less different the two measures will be.  Belief informs the lower bounds of 
deflection outcomes whereas Plausibility informs the upper bounds of deflection outcomes. To this extent, Belief 
is found to be useful for more strict assessment of confidence level on deflection missions. 
In order to evaluate Belief and Plausibility of a given deflection, basic probability assignment (BPA) 
structures for the NEA physical properties must be assembled (see Appendix A.1 for further details). A BPA 
     is a basic uncertainty measure which represents the degree of confidence in the truth of an event   (i.e. 
specific NEA physical property) and satisfies the following three axioms: 
 
                   2  (5)   
 
        (6)   
 
  ∑                   2   (7)   
 
where   denotes an empty set. All the events   that are subsets of the universal set         and those 
which have        are known as the focal elements. 
Epistemic uncertainties and parametric uncertainties (i.e. measurement errors) in a given parameter are 
described as a set of intervals with associated BPAs. Figure 7 is a schematic representation of such a BPA 
structure for the uncertain parameter   . In Table 6, the intervals for    are non-nested with each other, 
however in general, they can be nested. These interval values are usually obtained from observations and 
experiments as well as from expert opinions and hypotheses (see Appendix A.1 for further details). 
 
 
Figure 7 BPA structure for the uncertain parameter   . 
 
Table 6 Intervals with associated BPAs for the uncertain parameter   . 
Uncertain parameter Interval BPA 
   [   ,          
 [   ,          
 [   ,          
 
Evidence-based information from different sources that supports the truth of an event   can be aggregated 
using existing rules of combination. In this study, the Dempster rule of combination [22] given in Equation (8) 
is used, where       and       are the degrees of confidence in the truth of an event   and that in the 
truth of an event  , respectively. 
 
       
∑                
  ∑                
  ,      (8)   
 
Belief is then computed by summing the BPAs of events   that totally support the truth of the event   
while Plausibility is computed by summing the BPAs of events   which totally or partly support the truth of 
the event   as shown Equations (9) and (10), respectively. In other words, Belief and Plausibility inform the 
lower and upper bounds of the event   respectively. They pertain to each other by Equation (11). 
 
         ∑      |     (9)   
 
        ∑      |       (10)   
 
            ̅    (11)   
 
In this work, the following steps are performed to evaluate Belief and Plausibility of asteroid deflection: 
 
a) Collect all the necessary information on the asteroid characteristics from different literature (see Appendix 
A.1 for further details on information gathering). 
b) Determine the nominal physical properties of the NEA from the information collected in step a) as shown 
in Table 7, and design a mitigation system based on this baseline for the nominal deflection distance      
within              . The nominal deflection      is a b-plane deflection that will be achieved 
through the given deflection mission to the NEA actually bearing the nominal physical properties. 
c) Build BPA structures of the NEA characteristics by defining each uncertainty parameter as a set of 
intervals with prescribed BPAs and, if necessary, integrate BPA structures of the same parameter from 
different sources by means of the Dempster rule of combination. Those of micro density       , micro 
porosity       , bulk porosity      , and albedo    are shown in Table 12 in Appendix A.1. 
d) Calculate a set    of uncertain intervals of the NEA mass    and momentum enhancement factor   
with associated degree of confidence        which is simply the product of BPAs of related physical 
properties that support the truth of the set   . 
e) Given the mitigation system designed in step b) and the information on the set    of    and   with 
       from step d), compute the possible deflection   for the case of set   . Run over step d) and step 
e) for all the possible sets of    and  . As an example, Table 8 shows 16 sets of   ,  ,   , and  . 
f) Computed Belief        and Plausibility       of an arbitrary deflection b by Equations (12) and (13). 
 
         ∑         |      (12)   
 
        ∑         |        (13)   
 
In step b), the mitigation system is designed based on the nominal physical properties instead of considering a 
system margin approach or the worst-possible combination of NEA characteristics (e.g. largest micro-density, 
smallest bulk-porosity, highest albedo, etc. of each taxonomic class). The reason for this is because changing the 
design parameters does not contributed to the inherent uncertainty in deflection outcome subject to the epistemic 
uncertainties in the NEA characteristics. Of course, it is obvious that, if the mitigation system is designed in 
consideration of the system margin, the system can provided a nominal deflection with the asteroid, given the 
worst-possible combination of NEA characteristics. The resultant deflection is however still ambiguous due to the 
epistemic uncertainties originating from the incomplete preliminary NEA characterisation. 
Table 8 shows an example of BPA structures for the NEA mass   , momentum enhancement factor  , 
deflection   on the 2036 b-plane, and impulsive velocity change    given by KI. In this case, the nominal 
deflection      is set to 2.5 Earth-radii and the target NEA is VI1 of S-type characterised at the ground-based 
level.    can be calculated simply by Equation (1) whereas   is obtained by a solution of Equation (14) 
originating from the work by Holsapple et al. [23]. 
 
           3               
          (14)   
 
where   is impactor velocity,   is the material strength of the target asteroid, and   is the impactor density. 
The material strength of S-type is assumed to be 10 kPa and the impactor density is set to 3.0 g/cm
3
. The bulk 
density is given by                      . The impactor velocity for the case of KI is one of the design 
variables, hence is simply subject to the mitigation system design. 
 
Table 7 Nominal physical properties of three asteroid classes; micro density       , micro porosity       , bulk 
density      , bulk porosity      , geometric albedo   , and NEA mass   . A) Ground-based characterisation 
scenario. B) Space-based characterisation scenario. C) Proximity characterisation scenario. 
A)        (g/cm
3
)        (%)       (g/cm
3
)       (%)       (kg) 
S-type 3.45 10.66 2.20 36.17 0.19 3.17     
C-type 2.71 23.00 2.21 47.36 0.05 2.05     
M-type 7.87 0.60 2.27 17.55 0.12 9.32     
 
B)        (g/cm
3
)        (%)       (g/cm
3
)       (%)       (kg) 
S-type 3.45 10.66 1.42 36.12 0.18 3.17     
C-type 2.71 23.00 1.43 47.34 0.05 2.05     
M-type 7.87 0.60 1.47 17.45 0.12 9.33     
 
C)        (g/cm
3
)        (%)       (g/cm
3
)       (%)       (kg) 
S-type 3.45 10.89 6.49 34.35 0.19 3.26     
C-type 2.70 23.00 6.49 45.71 0.05 2.11     
M-type 7.88 0.60 6.85 13.14 0.12 9.84     
 
Table 8 Example of BPA structures for NEA mass   , momentum enhancement factor  , deflection   on the 
2036 b-plane, and the impulsive velocity change    by KI with impact velocity of 16.4 km/s.      is set to 
2.5 Earth-radii and the target NEA is VI1 of S-type characterised at the ground-based level. 
 
     (kg)     (Earth-radius)                  
 
 Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
 
   2.02   
  2.37     1.55 1.54 3.33 3.93 2.33 2.75 0.04 
   2.07   
  2.51     1.55 1.54 3.14 3.84 2.20 2.69 0.04 
   2.19   
  2.66     1.55 1.54 2.96 3.62 2.07 2.53 0.05 
   2.32   
  2.76     1.55 1.54 2.85 3.41 1.99 2.39 0.01 
   2.32   
  2.85     1.55 1.53 2.76 3.41 1.93 2.39 0.09 
   2.37   
  3.02     1.54 1.53 2.60 3.33 1.82 2.33 0.08 
   2.51   
  3.19     1.54 1.53 2.45 3.14 1.72 2.20 0.09 
   2.66   
  3.31     1.54 1.53 2.36 2.96 1.65 2.07 0.02 
   2.78   
  3.32     1.54 1.53 2.35 2.82 1.65 1.98 0.04 
    2.85   
  3.52     1.53 1.52 2.21 2.76 1.55 1.93 0.04 
    3.02   
  3.72     1.53 1.52 2.09 2.60 1.46 1.82 0.05 
    3.19   
  3.86     1.53 1.52 2.01 2.45 1.41 1.72 0.01 
    3.25   
  3.96     1.53 1.52 1.96 2.41 1.37 1.68 0.13 
    3.32   
  4.20     1.53 1.51 1.84 2.35 1.29 1.65 0.12 
    3.52   
  4.44     1.52 1.51 1.74 2.21 1.22 1.55 0.14 
    3.72   
  4.61     1.52 1.51 1.68 2.09 1.17 1.46 0.03 
 
  
The uncertainty in the outcomes (i.e. deflection distance  ) of respective deflection techniques represented by 
the Belief and Plausibility measures are shown in Figure 8, Figure 9, and summarised in Table 9. Care must be 
taken when interpreting the meaning of these results: the mitigation systems here are designed arbitrarily such that 
the resultant deflection satisfies the nominal deflection distance of 2.5 Earth-radii when the asteroid actual 
physical properties are identical to the nominal design parameters (i.e. nominal/baseline physical properties 
defined previously in Table 7). These results are therefore not particularly useful for efficiency analysis but they 
are merely for reliability analysis. For example, the GT system used to obtain the results assumed hugely massive 
GT spacecraft in order to provide the nominal deflection of 2.5 Earth-radii, given the 10-year warning time. Firstly, 
it can be seen that Belief and Plausibility measures inform lower and upper bounds of the outcomes of deflection 
missions. Such straightforward information is available through a conventional system margin approach which 
only considers a series of possible ranges of system design parameters (e.g.    and  ) without assigning 
probabilities (i.e. deflection outcomes are always given as a plain interval value without carrying any information 
about epistemic uncertainties within the interval.). On the other hand, these probability measures associated with 
Evidence Theory indicate confidence in every possible outcome of deflection missions, which is directly related 
to the source of uncertainty and current uncertainty level. To this extent, Evidence Theory allows a more rigorous 
quantification of uncertainties than the aforementioned system margin approach does. 
The results indicate that no matter how much literature or how many expert opinions one refers to for 
mitigation system design, as long as there are epistemic uncertainties and measurement errors in observational 
data, the uncertainty in deflection will be present. In other words, for whatever deflection b with           , 
the confidence in achieving that deflection distance is to a greater or lesser extent, compromised. 
Depending on the physical properties that are related to each deflection technique and also the taxonomic class 
of the asteroid, Belief/Plausibility of the deflection varies. Due to the substantial amount of uncertainty in albedo 
shown in Table 1, the uncertainty range of b-plane deflection achieved through the SC is considerably wide as 
seen in Figure 9-C), although belief and plausibility of the nominal deflection remain 0.4-0.6, similarly to the KI 
or the NI. Figure 8-A) and Figure 8-B) indicate that the KI and the NI are subject to more or less the same amount 
of uncertainty. This can be interpreted as both KI and NI are instantaneous deflection techniques that are 
dependent on the uncertainties in the mass and the momentum multiplication of the NEA but independent of the 
albedo value. It should be noted that, for the standoff NI deflection model considered in this paper, the momentum 
multiplication becomes of importance when dealing with the contribution of a fraction of high-velocity scattering 
debris of the NI spacecraft impinging on the asteroid surface. It is obvious that the NI is the most efficient NEA 
deflection technique in terms of the yield-to-weight (YTW) ratio among the four techniques but can never be the 
most accurate unless the target body is well-characterised through the proximity characterisation. Such a 
drawback of the NI may be minor and easily overcome by taking system margin into consideration and adjusting 
the standoff distance (i.e. trimming deflection leverage) before detonation, after pre-detonation in-situ 
characterisation of the target body by the NI spacecraft, itself. 
Figure 9-D) shows a series of results of the GT mission, where the amount of uncertainty in deflection is 
clearly smallest among the four deflection techniques in any characterisation scenarios as well as for any types of 
asteroid. These results indicate that the performance of GT is least dependent on the epistemic uncertainties in 
NEA physical characteristics, particularly on the uncertainty in mass. The reason for this is because the overall 
deflection efficiency of the GT system is dependent on the NEA mass, canting angle of ion thrusters, standoff 
distance, and the mission duration. Given the GT mission duration of 10 years and considering only one specific 
asteroid type, the optimal standoff distance, hence the canting angle of the ion thrusters slightly changes as the 
asteroid mass increases/decreases from the nominal value within its uncertain range. The change in the canting 
angle, in turn, results in the change in the ion thrusters’ output for hovering. For example, if the actual asteroid 
mass is smaller/larger than the nominal value, the standoff distance should be smaller/larger in order to provide the 
nominal deflection leverage (F      
 ⁄ ), which affects the canting angle, hence the required ion thrusters’ 
output for hovering. As a consequence, the deflection efficiency does not substantially increase/degrease due to 
the smaller/larger asteroid mass with respect to the nominal value, but instead, remains alike (compared with the 
nominal deflection efficiency). It should be noted however that the GT system is the least efficient deflection 
technique among the deflection techniques being evaluated, due to its low YTW ratio (e.g. hugely massive, 10-20 
tons of GT system mass is required to provide the NEA with the b-plane deflection of 2.5 Earth-radii, given 10 
years of warning time) and long mission duration. To this extent, a GT would be suitable for a secondary 
deflection mission that backs up a more unpredictable but efficient instantaneous deflection attempt. 
In summary, unless the preliminary characterisation is conducted at the proximity characterisation level, the 
outcome of a NEA deflection mission will always lack precision, whatever the design parameters (e.g. nominal 
NEA characteristics) and the design variables (e.g. mitigation system mass, impact velocity, collector size, etc.) 
are selected, hence the deflection performance will be compromised. Considering a system margin (i.e. 
increasing the deflection performance of a single mitigation system) in order to ensure                is 
valid here, however the aim of this work is not to design a single mitigation system that is capable of providing 
a desired deflection at its worst possible performance but to develop a mitigation campaign consisting of 
multi-deflection mission that retains a certain level of confidence in achieving a desired deflection even if the 
primary deflection mission is unsuccessful. 
 
Table 9 Lower and upper bounds of the deflection   (Earth-radius) on the 2036 b-plane for different deflection 
techniques, characterisation scenarios, and taxonomic classes. A) KI. B) NI. C) SC. D) GT. 
A) S-type C-type M-type 
Ground-based 1.70-3.97 1.70-4.38 2.05-3.33 
Space-based 1.81-3.55 1.83-3.75 2.11-3.11 
Proximity 2.29-2.66 2.38-2.61 2.45-2.57 
 
B) S-type C-type M-type 
Ground-based 1.71-3.93 1.71-4.32 2.01-3.33 
Space-based 1.82-3.52 1.84-3.71 2.11-3.12 
Proximity 2.29-2.65 2.34-2.62 2.46-2.57 
 
C) S-type C-type M-type 
Ground-based 1.11-5.23 1.60-4.60 1.46-4.54 
Space-based 1.34-4.23 1.74-3.90 1.61-3.99 
Proximity 2.15-2.85 2.35-2.63 2.35-2.74 
 
D) S-type C-type M-type 
Ground-based 2.32-2.81 2.38-2.85 2.25-2.86 
Space-based 2.35-2.79 2.41-2.80 2.29-2.77 
Proximity 2.48-2.56 2.49-2.54 2.48-2.54 
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Figure 8 Belief and Plausibility of deflection on the 2036 b-plane for different characterisation scenarios and 
asteroid classes. Black lines represent Belief measures whereas dashed black lines represent Plausibility 
measures. Green lines represent the nominal deflection distance     . A) KI. B) NI. 
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Figure 9 Belief and Plausibility of deflection on the 2036 b-plane for different characterisation scenarios and 
asteroid classes. Black lines represent Belief measures whereas dashed black lines represent Plausibility measures. 
Green lines represent the nominal deflection distance     . C) SC. D) GT.  
4. Mitigation campaign planning 
 
Mitigation campaigns should be accurately planned in order to provide a successful deflection even if the 
preliminary NEA characterisation is incomplete. Sending multiple spacecraft of one specific type of deflection 
technique (e.g. the multiple solar mirror concept of Maddock et al. [24] and the multiple GT concept of Foster et 
al. [25]) can increase the deflection efficiency as well as the redundancy of given deflection mission. However, 
such mitigation campaigns are inevitably subject to the uncertain performance of a specific deflection technique 
due to not only the epistemic uncertainties in the NEA characteristics but aleatory/practical uncertainties in the 
technique (e.g. the precision of a KI, the time-variable sublimation efficiency of a SC, etc.). 
Sending multiple asteroid deflection missions of different techniques is one of the answers to the design of a 
credible mitigation campaign. Here, we consider a dual-deflection mitigation campaign that combines the 
KI/NI/GT as a primary deflection mission and the GT as a secondary deflection mission in order to overcome 
the limits imposed on the single asteroid deflection approach and to make the given mitigation campaign more 
credible. The primary deflection mission makes use of an instantaneous/quasi-instantaneous (e.g. a 
week/month-long deflection mission by SC) deflection technique whereas the secondary deflection mission 
makes use of a slow push deflection technique. The final outcome of the given mitigation campaign is therefore 
determined by the secondary deflection mission which performs its slow-push deflection action according to the 
instantaneous outcome of the primary deflection mission that could be fully successful, partly successful, or at 
worst, complete failure. In addition to this, the secondary deflection mission should be capable of preventing the 
NEA from passing an undesired subsequent Earth impact keyhole on the 2036 b-plane due to the unexpected 
b-plane deflection of the primary mission. 
 
4.1. Dual-deflection campaign 
 
Dual-deflection campaigns studied here consist of a primary KI/NI/SC mission and a secondary GT mission, 
which are designated as KI-GT, NI-GT, and SC-GT campaigns, respectively. Figure 10 shows an example of 
KI-GT campaign under the 20-year warning time scenario. The transfer orbits of the KI and GT are determined 
by solving a conventional two-body Lambert’s problem. A conventional chemical propulsion system of 
    3   seconds is assumed as a kick stage at the Earth departure and also at the final approach to the target 
NEA to accelerate or decelerate. For the case of KI-GT campaign, two mitigation missions are sent to the NEA 
separately and hence follow two different trajectories. This allows the KI mission to take advantage of a higher 
relative velocity at the encounter with NEA while allowing the GT mission to rendezvous with the NEA without 
consuming an excessive amount propellant at NEA arrival. For this reason, the GT’s arrival could be earlier than 
the KI’s arrival, in which case the GT will be operational before and after the KI mission. On the other hand, for 
the case of NI-GT/SC-GT campaign, it is assumed that the two missions are sent together to the target NEA as a 
single mitigation system stack module while, apart from this difference, all the dual-deflection mitigation 
campaigns will be designed and optimised in the same manner with respect to the aforementioned series of 
competing aspects. In any scenario, it is assumed that the GT mission takes place immediately after its arrival at 
the NEA and is kept in operation regardless of an event associated with the primary deflection mission (e.g. 
kinetic impact, nuclear blast, solar ablation event, etc.). 
 
 Figure 10 Example of KI-GT campaign. The NEA orbit is represented in red. The transfer orbit of KI is 
represented in blue. The transfer orbit of GT is represented in green. Earth’s orbit is represented in grey. The 
blue and green circles represent the Earth departure points of the KI and GT, respectively. The KI interception 
and GT rendezvous points with the NEA are represented as the blue and green cross shapes, respectively. 
 
The system design variables in vector   and their bounds for KI-GT/NI-GT/SC-GT campaign are shown in 
Table 10.    and    are the masses of primary and secondary mitigation systems at NEA arrival, respectively. 
   and      are the Earth departure time and the flight time of the primary deflection mission whereas    and 
     are the Earth departure time and the flight time of the secondary deflection mission. The latter two are 
required only for KI-GT campaigns as two deflection missions are independently sent to the asteroid whereas they 
are not for NI-GT/SC-GT campaigns as two deflection missions are sent together. The primary deflection mission 
onset time       must be also defined for the NI-GT/SC-GT campaign as the two mitigation systems will be sent 
together such that the NEA arrival time may not be always optimal       of the given primary deflection mission. 
Note that       (      ∙  ̂   ) is the impact velocity increment in addition to the terminal NEA encounter 
relative velocity      of the impact trajectory of the KI mission. Finally,      and      are the time duration of 
the GT mission and the SC mission, respectively, where    is one orbital period of the given virtual impactor. The 
maximum value of the SC mission duration      is therefore one asteroid orbit at most; however, such a long SC 
mission duration is usually not necessary as will be shown later in this chapter. Interested readers should refer to 
details about the mass of each mitigation system at the NEA arrival, presented separately in Appendix A.2. 
 
Table 10 Minimum and maximum values of design variables   for a KI-GT/NI-GT/SC-GT campaign. The 
warning time is set to 20 years between 2016 and 2036.    is the orbital period of the target NEA. 
  KI-GT NI-GT SC-GT 
   (kg) 100-10000 0-300 0-300 
   (kg) 100-10000 100-10000 100-10000 
   2016/4/13-2036/4/13 2016/4/13-2036/4/13 2016/4/13-2036/4/13 
     (day) 30-1000 30-1000 30-1000 
   2016/4/13-2036/4/13   
     (day) 30-1000   
                - MOID          - MOID 
      (km/s) 0-100   
     (year) 0-20 0-20 0-20 
     (  )   0-1 
 
4.2. Campaign optimisation 
 
The dual-deflection mitigation campaign optimisation problem entails an assessment of the figures of merit 
(i.e. the mitigation performance indicators) in vector   that characterise the performance and the confidence in 
successful deflection through the given mitigation campaign. Seven figures of merit in vector   are described in 
Table 11.    is the total mitigation systems mass at the EDS which is equal to the sum of   D   and   D  : the 
masses of two mitigation systems at the respective Earth departure stages (EDS).    should be as small as 
possible to reduce the cost of the mitigation campaign. The upper bound of    is set to 100 tons.     and     are 
the asteroid arrival time of the mitigation system(s) and the campaign completion time (i.e. GT termination time), 
respectively.     is desirable to be as late as possible such that more time can be spent on decision-making of 
mitigation campaign enforcement.    , on the other hand, should be as early as possible such that an additional 
mitigation campaign can be launched, if necessary. Not to mention,     can be no later than    .      is the 
nominal deflection on the b-plane and desired to be as large as possible within the range of  ,            
32,      . The lower bound of      refers to the safe amount of deflection (1000 km on the b-plane) that is 
required to put the b-plane uncertainty ellipsoid off the secondary impact keyholes [26] whereas the upper bound 
is approximately equal to 5.0 Earth-radii.        and       are the Belief and Plausibility measures of nominal 
deflection distance. Higher Belief is simply an indication of higher confidence in successful mitigation. Finally, 
      is the post primary mission trim deflection achieved through the GT mission, which indicates the trim 
deflection capability of the given dual-deflection mitigation campaign for secondary impact keyhole avoidance. 
The maximum deflection distance of this trim deflection is set to 1000 km on the b-plane. 
  
Table 11 Figures of merit of mitigation campaign for different scenarios: KI-GT, NI-GT, and SC-GT. The smaller 
these figures are, the more optimal the given mitigation campaign is. Note that     is to be maximised as a later 
primary deflection completion time allows the planetary defense framework to delay the decision-making of the 
campaign as long as possible. 
  Description 
   Total mitigation systems mass at EDS (   D  +  D  ) 
     Primary deflection completion time 
    Secondary deflection completion time 
      Nominal deflection achieved through dual-deflection campaign 
        Belief of nominal deflection      
       Plausibility of nominal deflection      
       Trim (post-primary) deflection achieved through by GT mission 
 
Minimising the above-mentioned figures of merit inevitably entails a multi-objective optimisation problem. 
Following the conventional approach of Pareto optimal optimisation [1], the fast and elitist multiobjective 
genetic algorithm NSGA-II [27] is used to compute Pareto optimal design points of dual-deflection mitigation 
campaigns. A total of 2400 solutions for   from a hundred of generations are numerically computed in 
MATLAB. Detailed information about the multiobjective genetic algorithm is omitted in this paper and thus 
readers interested in the algorithm should refer to the work of NSGA-II developed by Deb et al. [27]. 
 
5. Results and discussion 
 
Selected optimisation results (i.e. Pareto-optimal solutions) of the KI-GT, NI-GT, and SC-GT campaigns are 
presented in the following subsections, respectively. 
 
5.1. KI-GT campaign 
 
The Pareto-optimal results of KI-GT campaigns against 140-metre sized S-type VI1 characterised under the 
ground-based characterisation scenario are shown in Figure 11. The colours of the dots represent the degrees of 
nominal deflection distances between 0.0-5.0 Earth-radii. The four plots on the left-hand side show the optimal 
solutions that satisfy          4  whereas those on the right-hand side satisfy            . The 
Pareto-optimal solutions are plotted for: KI Earth departure time vs. total mitigation system mass at EDS (   vs. 
  ); campaign completion time vs. total mitigation system mass at EDS (    vs.   ); KI mass vs. GT mass at 
EDS (  D   vs.   D  ); and KI Earth departure time vs. post-KI trim deflection, respectively (   vs.      ). 
Figure 11-A) and B) clearly show that many optimal mitigation campaigns are concentrated in the KI Earth 
departure time    around 2018. This appears to be due to the amplification effect of the VI1 perihelion passage on 
asteroid deflection attempts. More importantly, as the Belief of the nominal deflection increases, the number of 
solutions for the optimal mitigation campaigns decreases, which is simply because a KI-GT campaign with higher 
degree of Belief requires a larger fraction of the total mitigation system mass    for the secondary deflection 
mission (i.e. heavier GT mass at the EDS   D   for a larger post-KI deflection). In order to allocate a sufficient 
post-KI deflection through the GT mission, the KI Earth departure time is severely limited to the year 2018’s time 
frame as shown in Figure 11-B). As a consequence,    becomes substantially heavier than that in the campaigns 
with lower degrees of Belief. This in turn means that, if the campaign credibility is not prioritised, quite a few 
optimal solutions offer a relatively light-weight (20-40 tons) and late-term KI-GT campaigns (in 2025 or later) 
which suffice the safe b-plane deflection distance of 2.5    (4.16 Earth-radii) as shown Figure 11-A). 
Figure 11-C) shows that there are optimal mitigation campaigns of various nominal deflection 
distances within a wide range of campaign completion/GT termination time between 2018 and 2036 
whereas Figure 11-D) shows that a high confidence mitigation campaign with a high nominal deflection 
results in a late campaign completion, 2026 or later. However, it can be seen that     close to 2036 does 
not necessarily result in an effective mitigation campaign in terms of the nominal deflection distance. This 
can be interpreted as the inefficiency of GT missions close to the impact/Earth encounter epoch in 2036. 
Figure 11-E) and F) show the ratio of KI and GT masses at EDS. It can be seen that dual-deflection 
mitigation campaigns with large nominal deflection and high confidence level require larger fraction of 
the total mass    for the GT mission than the KI mission. This appears to be due to the inefficiency of 
the GT as a deflection technique with respect to the KI. 
When the secondary impact keyhole passage avoidance is concerned, Figure 11-A) and B) show that 
2033 will be the last launch opportunity for an effective keyhole mitigation campaign against VI1. 
Although the solutions around 2033 do not offer a large nominal deflection (dark blue dots), these 
dual-deflection mitigation campaigns still offer the nominal deflection distance of >1000 km which is 
more than enough to avoid secondary impact keyhole. In addition, the avoidance of undesired keyhole 
passage due to the primary deflection can be fulfilled, counting on the reserved trim deflection       by 
means of post-primary deflection GT trim manoeuvre (see Figure 11-G) and H)). Not surprisingly, the 
earlier the KI interception is, the larger       can be. The periods of time to achieve       range from 
months to years and are proportional to the nominal deflection and the confidence level/Belief of each 
campaign. 
Especially on the KI-GT campaign scenario against VI1, the GT rendezvous with the NEA could be 
before/after the KI arrival/interception time depending on the KI-GT campaign’s mission sequence. The former 
case is found to be highly beneficial as it enables proximity characterisation of the NEA as well as the precise 
guidance of the KI by GT spacecraft. The GT might start operating immediately after the NEA rendezvous before 
the KI arrival/impact, however most importantly, this is not always the case particularly but subject to the true 
values of the NEA physical properties. For example, if the in-situ NEA physical characterisation claims that the 
actual NEA mass is less heavy than the nominal value, the GT mission will simply add an extra deflection to the 
outcome of the primary deflection. 
As a final remark of the KI-GT campaign scenario, in practice, not only the NEA arrival but the Earth 
departure of the KI could be later than the GT arrival at the NEA, depending on the availability that is subject to 
the launch window, warning time, NEA orbit, etc. This is actually a critical issue on the KI mitigation system 
design as primary deflection mission because the GT spacecraft may be able to conduct preliminary 
characterisation of the NEA at the proximity characterisation level even before the Earth departure of the KI 
mission; however, the feasibility study of such a precursor characterisation mission by GT followed by a KI 
mission is out of scope of this paper, hence subject of future work. 
 
 Figure 11 Pareto-optimal solutions for KI-GT campaigns against S-type VI1. The colours of the dots represent the 
degrees of nominal deflection distances between 0.0-5.0 Earth-radii. The four plots on the left-hand side show the 
optimal solutions that satisfy          4  whereas those on the right-hand side satisfy            . 
 
5.2. NI-GT campaign 
 
The results on NI-GT campaigns against 140-metre sized S-type VI1 characterised under the ground-based 
characterisation scenario are shown in Figure 12 in a similar fashion as the results on KI-GT campaign scenario 
shown in the previous section. 
Figure 12-A) and B) clearly show that the NI-GT mitigation campaign scenario has more distinct 
optimality in terms of the NI-GT mitigation campaign launch window than the KI-GT mitigation campaign 
scenario. This might be accounted for by the fact that both NI and GT mitigation systems are delivered to 
the target asteroid as a single mitigation systems stack and rendezvous with it together such that optimal 
launch windows are more limited than the KI-GT scenario. As the Belief of the nominal deflection 
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increases, the number of solutions for such optimal mitigation campaigns decreases more profoundly 
than the KI-GT scenario, which is again because of the limited launch opportunities for the mitigation 
systems stack carrying the two mitigation systems. An NI-GT campaign with higher degree of Belief 
requires a larger mass for the GT mission while the mass required for the NI mission mostly remains 
smaller than 300 kg. 
A late-stage launch of the mitigation systems stack results in considerable deflection efficiency reduction and 
eventually regarded as non-optimal by the simulation. For this reason, the mitigation systems’ Earth departure 
time is severely limited particularly when a higher degree of Belief is concerned. On the other hand, if the 
campaign credibility is not prioritised, quite a few optimal solutions offer a relatively light-weight (10-30 tons) 
and late-term (2028~) NI-GT campaigns which suffice the safe b-plane deflection distance of 2.5    (4.16 
Earth-radii) as shown in Figure 12-A). 
Figure 12-C) seems akin to Figure 11-C), showing optimal mitigation campaigns of various nominal 
deflections within a wide range of campaign completion time between 2018 and 2036. Figure 12-D) is also similar 
to Figure 11-D), indicating that a mitigation campaign with high Belief and nominal deflection results in a late 
campaign completion time. 
Figure 12-E) and F) show the ratio of NI and GT masses at the NEA arrival instead of those at the EDS because 
they depart the Earth and sent to the target asteroid together. It can be seen that NI-GT mitigation campaigns 
basically entail very larger fraction of the total mass for the GT mission than the NI mission. This is simply due to 
the inefficiency of the GT as a deflection technique with respect to the NI which has the highest deflection yield 
per unit mass among all the deflection techniques considered in this paper. 
Similar to the KI-GT scenario, undesired keyhole passage due to the primary deflection can be avoided, 
counting on       achieved through the post-NI GT mission (see Figure 12-G) and H)). 
As a final remark of the NI-GT campaign scenario, an NI-GT mitigation campaign generally outperforms a 
KI-GT mitigation campaign. However, it still requires a relatively heavy GT spacecraft in order to achieve a high 
Belief/confidence level on the nominal deflection equal to or larger than the safe b-plane deflection. In reality, the 
NI and GT deflection missions will take place after the target asteroid is carefully characterised by spacecraft. 
This will substantially reduce the epistemic uncertainties in the fundamental NEA characteristics such as the mass, 
density, porosity, shape, etc. If that is the case, the NI mission can refer to the actual physical properties of the 
target body and regulate the NI deflection yield by changing the stand-off distance such that the nominal 
deflection can be achieved without the help of the post-NI deflection by GT mission for instance. 
 
 
Figure 12 Pareto-optimal solutions for NI-GT campaigns against S-type VI1. The colours of the dots represent the 
degrees of nominal deflection distances between 0.0-5.0 Earth-radii. The four plots on the left-hand side show the 
optimal solutions that satisfy          4  whereas those on the right-hand side satisfy            . 
 
5.3. SC-GT campaign 
 
The results of SC-GT campaigns against 140-metre sized S-type VI1 characterised under the ground-based 
characterisation scenario are shown in Figure 13 in the same fashion as the results on NI-GT campaign scenario. 
Figure 13-A) and B) show that there exist most of the optimal mitigation campaigns with large nominal 
deflections (i.e. red dots) having the SC Earth departure time    around 2018 while those campaigns after 2018 
become much less efficient in terms of nominal deflection leverage. Particularly when a higher value of Belief 
measure is concerned, the availability of mitigation campaigns with reasonable deflection after 2018 is strictly 
limited. According to Figure 13-G) and H), these optimal mitigation campaigns available around 2018 are 
associated with a relatively large fraction of the resultant b-plane deflection achieved through the GT mission. 
This be interpreted as the considerably large effects of the epistemic uncertainties in NEA physical properties on 
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the SC deflection efficiency. On the other hand, if the campaign credibility is not prioritised, some optimal 
solutions after 2025 offer a relatively light-weight (20-40 tons) SC-GT campaign which suffices the safe b-plane 
deflection distance of 2.5    (4.16 Earth-radii) as can be seen in Figure 13-A). 
Similar to the KI-GT and NI-GT scenarios, Figure 13-C) and D) show that there are optimal campaigns of 
various nominal deflection distances within a wide range of campaign completion time between 2020 and 2036. 
The optimal SC-GT mitigation campaign with the earliest completion time can be found around 2020 which is 
approximately two years later than those for the KI-GT and NI-GT mitigation campaign scenarios around 2018. 
This can be accounted for by the fact that the SC mission takes a few weeks to months in order to complete its 
deflection attempt. 
Figure 13-E) and F) show the ratio of SC and GT masses at NEA arrival. It can be seen that SC-GT mitigation 
campaigns generally require larger fraction of the total mitigation system mass for the GT mission than for the SC 
mission. This is due to the inefficiency of the GT as a deflection technique in comparison with the SC which is one 
of the most optimal deflection technique among the four deflection techniques considered in this doctoral paper. If 
a higher value of Belief measure is concerned, the GT mass becomes substantially larger than the SC mass. This is 
again due to the inefficiency of the GT as an asteroid deflection technique as well as due to the large uncertain 
outcome of the SC mission. It is therefore highly desirable to improve the deflection efficiency of the GT mission 
or simply to send more than a single SC mission to the target asteroid for the SC-GT campaign scenario. 
When the secondary impact keyhole passage is concerned, Figure 13-A) and B) show that 2029 will be 
basically the last launch opportunity for an effective mitigation campaign against VI1. In addition, the avoidance 
of undesired keyhole passage due to the primary deflection can be fulfilled, counting on the reserved deflection 
      by post-SC deflection achieved through the GT mission (see Figure 13-G) and H)). It seems that large       
is provided through the GT mission when the SC mission takes place in 2019 and thus the mitigation campaigns 
are more efficient than the late-term ones. 
 
 
Figure 13 Pareto-optimal solutions for SC-GT campaigns against S-type VI1. The colours of the dots represent the 
degrees of nominal deflection distances between 0.0-5.0 Earth-radii. The four plots on the left-hand side show the 
optimal solutions that satisfy          4  whereas those on the right-hand side satisfy            . 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Hazardous NEA mitigation campaign planning under the uncertainty-based information on the fundamental 
asteroid characteristics has been studied to improve the mitigation campaign credibility, where one of the possible 
forms of mitigation campaign – dual-deflection campaign – has been investigated in detail. In order to evaluate the 
confidence level of deflection missions subject to the uncertain NEA characteristics, the uncertainty quantification 
technique called Evidence Theory is used. The preliminary results of the dual-deflection campaigns consisting of 
a primary KI/NI/SC and a secondary GT have shown that: 
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 Dual-deflection campaign planning involves a series of competing aspects that must be assessed and constraints 
associated with the specific configurations of KI-GT/NI-GT/SC-GT to be satisfied to plan a mitigation 
campaign with sufficient performance (i.e. deflection) and high confidence in successful deflection (i.e. Belief). 
 Given a GT as a secondary deflection mission, the Belief of nominal deflection can be improved by years of 
orbit trim manoeuvre by GT before and after a primary deflection mission for the dual-deflection scenario. 
However, this does not necessarily means that the GT must always commence its deflection action immediately 
after its NEA rendezvous but the actual operation of the GT is subject to the in-situ NEA characteristics as well 
as the outcome of primary deflection mission. 
 Given 10-20 years of warning time, a mitigation campaign with a completion time of approximately half the 
warning time seems to be more reasonable than a longer-term mitigation campaign or a mitigation campaign 
with a heavier total mitigation systems mass at the EDS. This appears to be due to the deflection efficiency 
decrease with time and the high launch cost of necessary mitigation systems for any late-term mitigation 
campaigns. 
 Possible keyhole passage due to undesired deflection by primary KI/NI/SC mission can be avoided by GT as a 
secondary deflection mission in a dual-deflection campaign, given the necessary amount of deflection in order 
to avoid the keyhole passage is 1000km. 
 
Finally, the particular campaign planning approach presented here could be useful for the near-future hazard 
mitigation campaigns where we might have to tap into our incomplete knowledge of NEAs for mitigation 
campaign design, allowing to select the best possible combination of deflection missions from a catalogue of 
various possible mitigation campaign options, without compromising the campaign credibility. However, in the 
foreseeable future, further knowledge about the NEA population and some specific NEAs will have steadily 
accumulated and improved through the forthcoming NEA survey and exploration missions such as NEOSSat, 
Sentinel, Hayabusa2, and OSIRIS-Rex as well as the recently announced NASA’s NEA retrieval mission to be 
launched as soon as 2017. 
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Appendices 
 
 BPA structures for NEA physical properties A.1.
 
The uncertain NEA physical properties, more specifically, micro density       , micro porosity       , 
bulk porosity      , and albedo    are represented in the forms of BPA structures (i.e. a set of interval values 
with prescribed BPAs), respectively. The BPA structures for the S-type, C-type, and M-type NEAs are given in 
Table 12. Also, three different characterisation scenarios (the ground-based, space-based, and proximity-based 
characterisation scenarios) are considered, where differences in uncertainty level are represented appropriately 
by scaling down the overall interval of any parameter which is eligible to be more certain and by referring to the 
capability and limits of respective characterisation scenarios. The following sub-subsections present the details 
on the formation of the BPA structures for the respective taxonomic classes and the characterisation scenarios, 
acknowledging all the corresponding supporting information regarding these NEA physical properties. 
 
A.1.1. S-type 
 
The meteorite analogues of S-type asteroids were believed to be stony meteorites even before the Hayabusa 
spacecraft visited the S-type asteroid, namely 25143 Itokawa. The Hayabusa mission finally confirmed directly 
that the characteristics of Itokawa’s surface grains returned by the Hayabusa spacecraft are consistent with the 
characteristics of L, LL, and partly H chondrites [28]. Most importantly, the Hayabusa mission has proved the 
analogy between meteorites and NEA compositions through the in-situ study of the asteroid for the first time. 
The microscopic physical parameters of S-type asteroids are often estimated by referring to their meteorite 
analogues – ordinary chondrites (OCs), assuming they are homogeneously composed of OCs, L, LL, and H 
chondrites in particular. Although, the Hayabusa mission revealed that Itokawa’s surface is mostly made of L 
and LL chondrites [29], we cannot rule out the possible presence of subsurface metal-rich particles such as H 
chondrites buried inside Itokawa due to successive impact events. 
BPA structures for the physical properties of S-type asteroids are given in Table 12. The BPA structures for 
the micro density        are formed by referring to 437 samples of H, L, and LL chondrites [30]. In order to 
form the BPA structures for the micro porosity       , micro porosities of 691 OCs [31] are referred and 
aggregated with additional data on micro porosities of 291 OCs from the different literature [32] by Dempster’s 
rule of combination [22]. While most meteorites found on Earth spent long periods of time on the ground, and 
thus they are affected by considerable terrestrial weathering, it is noteworthy that the literature referred for 
       of OCs used in this study is de-biased to such effects. This is due to the fact that the majority of 
meteorite falls are stony meteorites and about 80% of which are OCs, hence the amount of information on 
non-weathered OCs is consequently most abundant among our collection of meteorite collection. 
The abundance of S-type asteroids amongst the well-characterised asteroids [16] and the series of 
exploration missions to the S-type asteroids also results in better understanding of the macroscopic 
characteristics of S-type asteroids. The BPA structures for the bulk porosity       of S-type asteroids are 
formed by referring to the bulk porosities of 7 existing S-type asteroids (smaller than 100 km in diameter) with 
bulk porosities ranging 20-60% [16]. Finally, the BPA structures for the albedo    are formed by referring to 
the observed geometric albedos of 30 different S-type asteroids [33]. 
 A.1.2. C-type 
 
The microscopic physical parameters of C-type asteroids can be roughly estimated by referring to their 
meteorite analogues – carbonaceous chondrites (CCs), assuming they are homogeneously composed of CCs. 
Since CCs represent less than 5% of stony meteorite falls, the information on non-weathered CCs is limited.  
BPA structures for the physical properties of C-type asteroids are given in Table 12. The BPA structures for 
the micro density        is formed by referring to 11 CM chondrites [34]. The micro porosity        is simply 
assumed to be 15.5-30.5% [30] which is consistent with the work of Flynn et al. [35]. This simple assumption is 
mainly due to the insufficient amount of sample data for unbiased micro porosities of CCs. 
C-type asteroids are second most abundant amongst the discovered NEAs, however unlike S-type asteroids, 
in-situ exploration missions to C-type asteroids (e.g. Hayabusa 2 and OSIRIS-REx) are yet to be sent, and hence 
the macroscopic characteristics of C-type asteroids are highly unknown. The BPA structures for the bulk 
porosity       of C-type asteroids are formed by referring to 8 existing C-type asteroids of various sizes with 
bulk porosities ranging 30-70% [16]. Finally, the BPA structures for the albedo    are formed by referring to 
the observed geometric albedos of 18 different C-type asteroids [33]. 
 
A.1.3. M-type 
 
Some of the discovered M-type asteroids (e.g. 21 Lutetia, 22 Kalliope, 129 Antigone, and 785 Zwetana) are 
not entirely consistent with typical iron-nickel meteorite analogues whereas (e.g. 16 Psyche, 216 Klepatra, and 
(6178) 1986 DA) appear to be metallic. One of the smallest M-type asteroids, namely (6178) 1986 DA is a very 
good candidate of metallic asteroids which are thought to be a remnant of the core of a fractured primitive body 
from the early solar system. The meteorite analogues of metallic M-type asteroids are basically iron meteorites. 
The microscopic physical parameters of M-type asteroids can be roughly estimated by referring to their 
meteorite analogues – iron meteorites, assuming they are homogeneously composed of iron meteorites. Iron 
meteorites represent less than 6% [36] of all the meteorite falls, and thus the amount of information on 
non-weathered iron meteorites is most limited. 
Iron meteorites are known to be more immune to terrestrial weathering, and thus there is usually less 
difference between weathered and unweathered samples than fragile chondrite meteorites. BPA structures for 
the physical properties of M-type asteroids are given in Table 12. The BPA structures for the micro density 
       is formed by referring to 21 iron-nickel meteorites [37]. The micro porosity        is simply assumed 
to be 0-1.2% [38]. This range is consistent with the iron-nickel meteorites of the Vatican collection with 
porosities of near zero [39]. 
M-type asteroids are least abundant amongst the three asteroid types, and thus their macroscopic 
characteristics are mostly unknown. Not to mention, they have not been characterised by spacecraft and, unlike 
S-type and C-type asteroids, remote characterisation of M-type asteroids is not an easy task because the 
spectrum analysis of them provide us with less information than that of the other two types does. The BPA 
structures for the bulk porosity       of M-type asteroids are formed by referring to 7 existing M-type asteroids 
of various sizes with bulk porosities ranging 0-40% [16]. Finally, the BPA structures for the albedo    are 
formed by referring to the observed geometric albedo of 10 different M-type asteroids [33].  
Table 12 BPA structures for the fundamental NEA physical properties of S-type, C-type, and M-type asteroids. 
A) Ground-based characterisation. B) Space-based characterisation. C) Proximity characterisation. 
A) S-type C-type M-type 
       
 Interval BPA Interval BPA Interval BPA 
       (g/cm
3
) [3.23, 3.30] 0.31 [2.57, 2.60] 0.18 [7.59, 7.60] 0.05 
 [3.30, 3.50] 0.29 [2.60, 2.70] 0.36 [7.60, 7.80] 0.19 
 [3.50, 3.70] 0.33 [2.70, 2.80] 0.18 [7.80, 8.00] 0.62 
 [3.70, 3.84] 0.07 [2.80, 2.86] 0.27 [8.00, 8.07] 0.14 
       (%) [3.7, 5.0] 0.01 [15.5, 30.5] 1.00 [0.0, 1.2] 1.00 
 [5.0, 7.5] 0.10     
 [7.5, 10.0] 0.30     
 [10.0, 12.5] 0.32     
 [12.5, 15.0] 0.22     
 [15.0, 16.3] 0.05     
      (%) [16.4, 30.0] 0.43 [27.5, 40.0] 0.25 [0.0, 10.0] 0.43 
 [30.0, 40.0] 0.14 [40.0, 50.0] 0.37 [10.0, 20.0] 0.14 
 [40.0, 50.0] 0.29 [50.0, 60.0] 0.25 [20.0, 30.0] 0.14 
 [50.0, 56.0] 0.14 [60.0, 67.8] 0.13 [30.0, 37.9] 0.29 
   [0.10, 0.15] 0.27 [0.04, 0.05] 0.33 [0.08, 0.11] 0.30 
 [0.15, 0.20] 0.37 [0.05, 0.06] 0.44 [0.11, 0.13] 0.40 
 [0.20, 0.25] 0.23 [0.06, 0.07] 0.17 [0.13, 0.16] 0.10 
 [0.25, 0.28] 0.13 [0.07, 0.073] 0.06 [0.16, 0.17] 0.20 
 
B) S-type C-type M-type 
       
 Interval BPA Interval BPA Interval BPA 
       (g/cm
3
) [3.23, 3.30] 0.31 [2.57, 2.60] 0.18 [7.59, 7.60] 0.05 
 [3.30, 3.50] 0.29 [2.60, 2.70] 0.36 [7.60, 7.80] 0.19 
 [3.50, 3.70] 0.33 [2.70, 2.80] 0.18 [7.80, 8.00] 0.62 
 [3.70, 3.84] 0.07 [2.80, 2.86] 0.27 [8.00, 8.07] 0.14 
       (%) [3.7, 5.0] 0.01 [15.5, 30.5] 1.00 [0.0, 1.2] 1.00 
 [5.0, 7.5] 0.10     
 [7.5, 10.0] 0.30     
 [10.0, 12.5] 0.32     
 [12.5, 15.0] 0.22     
 [15.0, 16.3] 0.05     
      (%) [21.4, 30.0] 0.43 [32.5, 40.0] 0.25 [2.86, 10.0] 0.43 
 [30.0, 40.0] 0.14 [40.0, 50.0] 0.37 [10.0, 20.0] 0.14 
 [40.0, 50.0] 0.29 [50.0, 60.0] 0.25 [20.0, 30.0] 0.14 
 [50.0, 51.4] 0.14 [60.0, 62.5] 0.13 [30.0, 32.9] 0.29 
   [0.14, 0.15] 0.31 [0.041, 0.05] 0.33 [0.09, 0.11] 0.30 
 [0.15, 0.20] 0.42 [0.05, 0.06] 0.44 [0.11, 0.13] 0.40 
 [0.20, 0.25] 0.27 [0.06, 0.07] 0.17 [0.13, 0.15] 0.10 
 
 
 [0.07, 0.071] 0.06 [0.15, 0.16] 0.20 
 
C) S-type C-type M-type 
       
 Interval BPA Interval BPA Interval BPA 
       (g/cm
3
) [3.26, 3.30] 0.31 [2.59, 2.60] 0.18 [7.64, 7.80] 0.20 
 [3.30, 3.50] 0.29 [2.60, 2.70] 0.36 [7.80, 8.00] 0.65 
 [3.50, 3.70] 0.33 [2.70, 2.80] 0.18 [8.00, 8.04] 0.15 
 [3.70, 3.76] 0.07 [2.80, 2.83] 0.27   
       (%) [8.2, 10.0] 0.35 [19.8, 26.3] 1.00 [0.0, 1.2] 1.00 
 [10.0, 12.5] 0.39     
 [12.5, 13.2] 0.26     
      (%) [34.4, 34.4] 1.00 [45.7, 45.7] 1.00 [13.1, 13.1] 1.00 
   [0.17, 0.20] 0.61 [0.049, 0.05] 0.43 [0.11, 0.13] 0.80 
 [0.20, 0.21] 0.39 [0.05, 0.06] 0.57 [0.13, 0.131] 0.20 
 
 Mass of mitigation system at NEA arrival A.2.
 
The mass of each mitigation system at the NEA arrival (regardless of its type: high-velocity interception or 
rendezvous) is briefly explained here. 
The mass of the KI system   I is given by Equation (15).      is the fraction of the KI system that 
actually makes an impact with the asteroid and      |   is the propellant mass for terminal guidance of the KI 
system.      is therefore basically the dry mass of the KI system. In this paper, terminal guidance control 
itself is not analysed in detail and this propellant accounts for the KI system’s terminal acceleration through the 
chemical thruster before the very moment of the interception. 
 
   I            |   (15)   
 
The mass of the NI system   I is given by Equation (16), where it is assumed that a 30% fraction of   I 
accounts for the mass of the nuclear warhead     onboard the NI system and the rest accounts for the mass of 
all the necessary components for a deep space exploration probe like Deep Space 1 or Hayabusa [40, 41]. 
 
   I    3⁄     (16)   
 
The mass of the SC spacecraft     is given by Equation (17) as a function of the collector’s diameter     by 
reference to the system mass breakdown and model for the solar concentrator “umbrella” from the work of 
Gritzner and Kahle [42]. It is assumed that 30% of     accounts for the SC assembly [43] and the other 70% of 
    accounts for the thruster/beam generator, power subsystem, propulsion system, propellant masses, etc. The 
first term of Equation (18) accounts for the mass of the collector’s aluminium-coated 90% reflectivity Mylar (18.9 
g/m
2
). The second term accounts for the mass of telescopic rods (2.4 kg/m), central boom (0.5 kg/m), and ropes 
(0.16 kg/m). The last one represents the total mass of eight 4-kg winches. Readers interested in more details on the 
configuration of the “umbrella” concept should refer to the previous literature [42]. 
 
       3⁄       3⁄ (       
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 3       32) (17)   
 
Finally, the mass of the GT spacecraft     is the sum of the dry mass      and the propellant mass for 
hovering. It is assumed that 50% of the dry mass accounts for the mass of power supply     [43]. 
 
 
              |      
            
(18)   
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